Workmen\u27s Auto Insurance Company v. Chubb Customer Center, Inc., dba Chubb Group of Insurance Companies : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
Workmen's Auto Insurance Company v. Chubb
Customer Center, Inc., dba Chubb Group of
Insurance Companies : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Eric C. Singleton; Brett Marshall Godfrey; Godfrey & Associates; Counsel for Appellee.
Trent J. Waddoups; Carr & Waddoups; Counsel for Workmen's Auto Insurance .
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Workmen\'s Auto Insurance v. Chubb Customer Center, No. 981413 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1715
;UUHT OF APPEAL* 
BRIEF 
t/TAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 J 
.A10 
DOCKET NO 3&Hi3d3ti fi^THEUTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WORKMEN'S AUTO INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) 
vs. ] 
CHUBB CUSTOMER CENTER, INC., ; 
dba CHUBB, GROUP OF INSURANCE ; 
COMPANIES, ; 
Defendant and Appellee. ] 
i Case Number: 
) District Court No: 
) Priority Number: 
981413-CA 
960013632 CV 
15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
WORKMEN'S AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT, PRESIDING 
Eric C. Singleton [A 6799] 
201 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Brett Marshall Godfrey, Esq. 
GODFREY & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
4643 South Ulster, Suite 920 
Denver, Colorado 80237 
Counsel for: 
Chubb Customer Center, Inc., 
dba Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 
Appellee 
Trent J. Waddoups [A 7657] 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
201 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
Fax: (801)363-8512 
Counsel for: 
Workmen's Auto Insurance Company, 
Appellant 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WORKMEN'S AUTO INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) 
vs. ] 
CHUBB CUSTOMER CENTER, INC., ; 
dba CHUBB GROUP OF INSURANCE 
COMPANIES, ; 
Defendant and Appellee. ] 
) Case Number: 
) District Court No: 
) Priority Number: 
981413-CA 
960013632 CV 
15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
WORKMEN'S AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT, PRESIDING 
Eric C. Singleton [A 6799] 
201 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Brett Marshall Godfrey, Esq. 
GODFREY & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
4643 South Ulster, Suite 920 
Denver, Colorado 80237 
Counsel for: 
Chubb Customer Center, Inc., 
dba Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 
Appellee 
Trent J. Waddoups [A 7657] 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
201 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
Fax: (801)363-8512 
Counsel for: 
Workmen's Auto Insurance Company, 
Appellant 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
INTRODUCTION 1 
ARGUMENT 3 
I. AN EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP IS 
CONTRACTUAL IN NATURE AND INCORPORATES 
DUTIES (AND CORRESPONDING LIABILITIES) WHICH 
ARE IMPOSED BY LAW, THUS WAGON TONGUE'S 
EMPLOYMENT OF CATHERINE JACOBSEN 
CONSTITUTED AN "INSURED CONTRACT." 3 
II. CHUBB DID NOT FILE A CROSS-APPEAL; 
THEREFORE, THE COURT HAS NO SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO CHUBB'S 
NO-COVERAGE ARGUMENT 
III. WITH RESPECT TO CONDUCT WITHIN THE COURSE 
AND SCOPE OF HER EMPLOYMENT, CATHERINE 
JACOBSEN WAS AN INSURED UNDER CHUBB'S 
INSURANCE POLICY ISSUED TO HER EMPLOYER . . . 
IV. SUBSECTION b(2) DOES NOT EXCLUDE COVERAGE 
FOR THE ACCIDENT 11 
ALTERNATIVELY, WAGON TONGUE IS INSURED 
FOR ITS SEVERAL LIABILITY, AND CATHERINE 
JACOBSEN IS A COINSURED FOR THE LIMITED 
PURPOSE OF DEFEATING CHUBB'S RIGHT OF 
SUBROGATION 12 
i 
VI. THE COURT MAY NOT AFFIRM THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S JUDGMENT ON ANY THEORY WHICH IS 
NOT APPARENT FROM THE RECORD 15 
CONCLUSION 17 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES pages 
Board of Educ. of Jordan Sch. Dist. v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1977) 13, 14 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993) 5 
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982) 8 
Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1991) 7 
Dowsett v. Dowsett, 207 P.2d 809 (Utah 1949) 3, 5 
Fashion Place Inv., Ltd. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989) 13, 14 
Fuller v. Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1985) 7 
Geico v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672 (Utah 1982) 7 
GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1994) 13 
Goetz v. American Reliable Ins. Co., 844 P.2d 366 (Utah App. 1992) 8 
Halladay v. Cluff, 739 P.2d 643 (Utah App. 1987) 8 
ii 
Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Home Indemnity Co., 50 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1976) 7 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993) 14 
Hind v. Quilles, 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987) 8 
In re Cassity, 875 P.2d 548 (Utah 1994) 16 
John Deere Co. v. A & H Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1994) 15 
LDS Hospital v. Capital Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857 (Utah 1988) 11 
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290 (Utah 1969) 15 
Nelson v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 935 P.2d 512 (Utah 1997) 12 
Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993) 15 
Olympus Hills Shopping v. Smith's Food & Drug, 889 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1994) . . . . 5 
Phil Schroeder, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 659 P.2d 509 (Wash. 1983) 11 
PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792 (Utah App. 1997) 5 
Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995) 5 
Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 1980) 8 
Turtle v. Hi-land Dairyman's Assoc, 350 P.2d 616 (Utah 1960) 9 
Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984) 15 
Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916 (Utah 1991) 15 
iii 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-908 9 
UTAHCODE ANN. § 31A-22-303(l)(b)(i) 1 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-303(l)(b)(ii) 1,9 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Utah R. App. P. 4(d) 8 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 15 
COMMENTATORS 
3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (2d ed. 1993) 5 
2A C.J.S. Agency § 2 9 
5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1464(1) 15 
16 Couch on Insurance 2d (Rev. Ed. 1983) 13 
77 C.J.S. Respondeat Superior 6 
IV 
INTRODUCTION 
Catherine Jacobsen negligently caused an accident as she was driving her own 
vehicle to the hospital to retrieve a co-worker. Ms. Jacobsen's excursion was undertaken 
at the request and direction of her employer. The parties stipulate that Ms. Jacobsen was 
acting within the course and scope of her employment with Chubb's insured — Wagon 
Tongue — at the time of the accident. 
Workmen's Auto Insurance Company ("Workmen's Auto") had issued an owner's 
policy covering the vehicle Catherine Jacobsen was driving and covering all members of 
the named insured's household. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-303(l)(b)(i). Chubb 
Group ("Chubb") insured Wagon Tongue, Inc., and its business auto policy included an 
operator's policy covering the use of non-owned vehicles for business purposes. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-303(l)(b)(ii). 
The sole issue presented for review is whether the two insurance companies 
provided concurrent primary liability insurance coverage for the event in question. 
Wagon Tongue was performing its business through its employee, Catherine Jacobsen, at 
the time of the accident. A corporation only acts through its employees, and the acts of 
the employees are the acts of the corporation as a matter of law. The corporate actions 
were covered under Chubb's insurance policy, but its policy provided only secondary 
1 
coverage for the event unless Wagon Tongue's liability was assumed under an insured 
contract (as that term is defined in Chubb's policy). 
Wagon Tongue's liability for Catherine Jacobsen's negligence was constructively 
assumed through the act of hiring Catherine Jacobsen and exercising the right to control 
her actions. In other words, Wagon Tongue's liability was constructively assumed under 
the employment contract pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
I. AN EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP IS 
CONTRACTUAL IN NATURE AND INCORPORATES 
DUTIES (AND CORRESPONDING LIABILITIES) WHICH 
ARE IMPOSED BY LAW, THUS WAGON TONGUE'S 
EMPLOYMENT OF CATHERINE JACOBSEN 
CONSTITUTED AN "INSURED CONTRACT." 
Chubb acknowledges the employer/employee relationship between Wagon Tongue 
and Catherine Jacobsen, but it argues that Wagon Tongue never entered into a contract 
with Catherine Jacobsen whereby it assumed her liability. Chubb's Opposition Brief at 
p. 8. Chubb misunderstands the duties and obligations which are constructively assumed 
by an employer when it forms an employment relationship with an employee. It is 
axiomatic that an employer (Wagon Tongue) assumes liability of its employees 
(Catherine Jacobsen) for negligent acts committed during the course and scope of 
employment. No written contract stating the foregoing is required. See Dowsett v. 
Dowsett 207 P.2d 809 (Utah 1949) (recognizing that the relationship of master and 
servant arises out of a contract of employment). 
The employment contract which formed the relationship between Wagon Tongue 
and Catherine Jacobsen was not a written contract. Ms. Jacobsen worked in Wagon 
Tongue's Iceberg Restaurant. She did not negotiate a contractual clause pursuant to 
which Wagon Tongue agreed to assume her liability to third parties. Instead, such a 
3 
contractual clause forms a part of every employment contract, and it cannot be waived by 
either party. 
The doctrine of respondeat superior expands the tort remedies available to injured 
parties by providing that a remedy sounding in tort shall be available in certain situations. 
The remedy is provided through the imposition of vicarious tort liability on 
non-negligent employers by and through the application of agency law. Chubb correctly 
notes that this assumption of liability is based upon principles of equity. Chubb's 
Opposition Brief at p. 7. What Chubb and the district court fail to understand is that the 
imposition of tort liability (or, conversely, access to a tort remedy against a negligent 
agent's principal) does not transform the equitable doctrine of respondeat superior into 
"'a mechanism in tort law.'" Chubb^s Opposition Brief at p. 7 (quoting Amended Ruling 
of the district court). 
Tort liability is only assumed by non-negligent parties where the non-negligent 
party and the negligent party are parties to an agency relationship. An agency 
relationship is created where one party contracts or agrees to act on behalf of and for the 
benefit of the other party. The party acting is the "agent" and the party on whose behalf 
the agent acts is the "principal." In sum, the basis of the tort liability assumed by a 
principal for the acts of its agent is the contract forming the principal/agent (sometimes 
4 
hereinafter employer/employee or master/servant) relationship. See Dowsett v. Dowsett, 
207 P.2d 809 (Utah 1949). 
The contract forming the principal/agent relationship may be express or implied. 
Regardless of the form of the contract, the law imposes certain obligations on parties to 
an employment contract. For example: (1) The duty of good faith and fair dealing; and 
(2) Third party tort liability pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. This Court 
has described the nature of the duty of good faith: 
"While it is true that courts impose an obligation of good faith in 
every aspect of the contractual relationship . . . the obligation of 
good faith is 'constructive' rather than 'implied'" because the 
obligation is imposed by law and cannot be disclaimed. 
PDO Lube Or., Inc. v. Huber. 949 P.2d 792 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Olympus Hills 
Shopping Ctr.. Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs.. Inc.. 889 P.2d 445, 450 n.4 (Utah App. 
1994) (quoting 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 654A(B) (2d ed. 1993) 
(emphasis added))); see also Savage v. Educators Ins. Co.. 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995) 
(citing Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur.. 854 P.2d 527, 535 (Utah 1993) ("Even though 
the remedy set out in Ammerman sounds in tort because the relationship of the contracting 
parties is a fiduciary one while that in Beck is purely contractual, both first- and 
third-party claims arise only because of the contractual relationship of the parties.") 
(emphasis added)). 
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The same principle described by this Court with respect to the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing is applicable to the doctrine of respondeat superior. The liability which 
may be imposed upon a principal for the negligent acts of those contractually obligated to 
act on the principal's behalf arises out of the contract forming the principal/agent 
relationship and is imposed only for actions actually taken for the benefit of the principal 
(i.e., within the "course and scope" of the actor's employment). Tort liability of an agent 
to pay for damages suffered by a third party is thus assumed by the principal (jointly and 
severally) under the principal's contract with its agent by operation of the doctrine of 
respondeat superior. See 77 CJ.S. Respondeat Superior, pp. 317-320. 
Of course, the parties are free to enter into a contractor/contractee relationship 
which would not give rise to the imposition of vicarious liability. But upon forming an 
agency relationship, the law constructively imposes on the principal (and thus the 
principal constructively assumes under its contract or agreement) the tort liability of its 
agent toward third parties. 
Under Wagon Tongue's insurance policy, Chubb provided primary liability 
insurance coverage for damages suffered by a third party so long as Wagon Tongue 
assumed the liability for the damages under "any . . . contract or agreement" pertaining to 
its business. Chubb Coverage Form at Section IV(B¥5¥c) and V(P)(5). In sum, Chubb 
6 
formed an employment contract with Catherine Jacobsen, and assumed the tort liability of 
Catherine Jacobsen to third parties because the employment agreement imposed 
Catherine Jacobsen's tort liability on Wagon Tongue. 
If the foregoing recitation is a reasonable1 application of the facts of this case to 
the language of the insurance contract within the framework of the law, then Chubb 
provided concurrent primary coverage. See Fuller v. Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 
1047 (Utah 1985) (("An insured is entitled to the broadest protection he could have 
reasonably understood to be provided by the policy.") (emphasis added)). 
1
 Workmen's Auto does not have to be absolutely right, just arguably right. See 
Geico v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672 (Utah 1982) ("the interpretation of the terms involved is 
not fixed but varies according to the circumstances of the case. * * * [M]ost courts will 
interpret the terms so as to extend the coverage if this can be done under any reasonable 
interpretation of the facts." (quoting Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Home Indemnity 
Co., 241 Cal. App. 2d 303, 50 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511-12 (1976) (other citations omitted))). 
7 
II. CHUBB DID NOT FILE A CROSS-APPEAL; THEREFORE, 
THE COURT HAS NO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
WITH RESPECT TO CHUBB'S NO-COVERAGE 
ARGUMENT. 
Where subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the Court nor the parties 
"can do anything to fill the void." Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1173-74 (Utah App. 
1991). A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Id, Chubb raises 
the same argument that it raised at the district court level, namely that Subsection (b)(2) 
"excepts" Catherine Jacobsen from her status as an insured. The district court did not 
agree with this argument. Chubb argues that the district court did not expressly disagree 
with the argument, rather the court was silent. Chubb's Opposition Brief at p. 6. 
The district court's silence may not raise a justiciable inference that the court's 
ruling was based upon Chubb's argument. On the contrary, if the court had accepted 
Chubb's argument, its analysis would have immediately stopped. See Goetz v. American 
Reliable Ins. Co., 844 P.2d 366 (Utah App. 1992) ("Undertaking such analysis, one never 
gets to the 'excess coverage' provision"); see also Hind v. Ouilles. 745 P.2d 1239, 1239 
(Utah 1987) (per curiam) ("Inasmuch as all other issues depend on a finding of coverage 
under the policy, we do not address them."). 
Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure explicitly requires that a notice 
of cross-appeal be timely filed. There is no record of such a filing. Absent a cross-appeal, 
8 
Chubb may not attack the judgment of the district court. "[I]f a respondent desires to 
attack the judgment and change it in his favor, he must timely file a cross-appeal.. . ." 
Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst.. 617 P.2d 700, 701-02 (Utah 1980): see also 
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1982); Halladav v. 
Cluff. 739 P.2d 643, 644-45 (Utah App. 1987). cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
For this reason, the Court must decline to consider the merits of Chubb's purported 
cross-appeal. 
III. WITH RESPECT TO CONDUCT WITHIN THE COURSE 
AND SCOPE OF HER EMPLOYMENT, CATHERINE 
JACOBSEN WAS AN INSURED UNDER CHUBB'S 
INSURANCE POLICY ISSUED TO HER EMPLOYER. 
Wagon Tongue purchased an insurance policy2 covering its business's vehicles 
and all other vehicles used in its business. The coverages purchased included an 
operator's policy covering non-owned autos including Catherine Jacobsen's vehicle at the 
time of her accident. Defendant's Opposition Brief at pp. 9-10; see also UTAH CODE 
ANN. §31A-22-303(l)(b)(ii). 
Wagon Tongue was a corporation. A corporation is not a natural person. It is an 
artificial entity created by law, and as such it cannot act in person. It must act in its 
2
 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-908. 
9 
affairs through its agents and representatives. See Tuttle v. Hi-land Dairyman's Assoc. 
350 P.2d 616 (Utah 1960). Therefore, Chubb knew when it insured Wagon Tongue that it 
was issuing liability coverage for the negligence of Wagon Tongue's employees. This 
knowledge is imputed to Chubb by law: 
The law of agency is based on the Latin maxim "Qui facit per 
alium, facit per se," variously rendered as "He who does an 
act through another is deemed in law to do it himself, . . . . 
2A C.J.S. Agency § 2, p. 549. In other words, it could be said that Catherine Jacobsen 
was not negligent; but rather Wagon Tongue was negligent because, as a matter of law, 
Wagon Tongue was driving Catherine Jacobsen's vehicle through her.3 
Catherine Jacobsen was insured as a "you" under Chubb's insurance policy. The 
"person" defined as a "you" in Chubb's policy was the corporation named on the 
declarations page — Wagon Tongue. It is not reasonable to believe that Chubb issued an 
operator's policy to a corporation which only covered non-owned vehicles when actually 
operated by the incorporeal legal fiction. 
Moreover, identifying Wagon Tongue, Inc. as the named insured makes the 
definition of "you" sufficiently broad to include persons through whom actions are taken 
3
 Nevertheless, Wagon Tongue was a permissive user of Catherine Jacobsen's 
vehicle and was, thus, Workmen's Auto's insured. Therefore, Workmen's Auto properly 
provided primary insurance coverage for its negligence. 
10 
by the corporation (i.e., the corporation's employees while the employees are acting 
within the course and scope of their employment). Catherine Jacobsen was, as a matter of 
law, Wagon Tongue ("you") when she negligently injured Patti Zimmerman. Therefore, 
Chubb insured the driver and the vehicle. And Chubb's coverage for its insureds' 
liability to Ms. Zimmerman was primary as explained above. 
IV. SUBSECTION b(2) DOES NOT EXCLUDE COVERAGE FOR 
THE ACCIDENT. 
Chubb argues that Subsection b(2) applies to exclude Catherine Jacobsen from the 
definition of insureds. Defendant's Opposition Brief at pp. 9-10. Coverage is not 
excluded by Subsection b(2) because coverage is not extended by Section b. 
As explained above, Section 11(A)(1)(a) makes Catherine Jacobsen an insured 
while she was driving her vehicle within the course and scope of her employment. 
Section 11(A)(1)(b) declares, in addition, that an insured is anyone using a covered auto 
"you [do] own hire or borrow." The auto driven by Catherine Jacobsen, however, was a 
nonowned auto ("9") which is defined in Chubb's policy as an auto "you do not own . . . 
hire . . . or borrow." Therefore, Section 11(A)(1)(b) does not apply to the particular 
covered auto, and, hence, Subsection II(A)(l)(b)(2) cannot "except" coverage from a 
section that does not grant coverage. 
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In addition, while it is true that coverage is not granted through the 
non-applicability of an exclusion, Chubb's policy includes a number of exceptions which 
do not apply to the current situation: 
Where exceptions, qualifications or exemptions are introduced into 
an insurance contract, a general presumption arises to the effect that 
that which is not clearly excluded from the operation of such 
contract is included in the operation thereof. 
LPS Hospital v. Capital Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) (quoting Phil 
Schroeder. Inc. v. Roval Globe Ins. Co.. 659 P.2d 509. 511 (Wash. 1983)). 
V. ALTERNATIVELY, WAGON TONGUE IS INSURED FOR 
ITS SEVERAL LIABILITY, AND CATHERINE JACOBSEN 
IS A COINSURED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF 
DEFEATING CHUBB'S RIGHT OF SUBROGATION. 
At minimum, Wagon Tongue was insured for its liability with respect to the 
accident. "Under the principle of respondeat superior, the employer and its employee are 
jointly and severally liable for the negligent torts of the employee in the course of 
employment." Nelson v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop. 935 P.2d 512 (Utah 1997) 
(Howe, J., concurring). All of the foregoing analysis regarding the assumption of liability 
through an employment contract is applicable to the joint and several liability of Wagon 
Tongue, and Wagon Tongue's liability is still assumed under an "insured contract" giving 
rise to Chubb's primary coverage. However, if only Wagon Tongue were insured under 
12 
Chubb's policy for its several liability, Chubb might be able to assert a right of 
subrogation against Catherine Jacobsen (which would be defended and paid by 
Workmen's Auto) thus mooting this litigation.4 
If the Court were to find that primary coverage was based solely on the fact of 
Wagon Tongue's common law liability and Chubb's coverage for Wagon Tongue's joint 
and several liability, the Court would then consider whether Wagon Tongue's employees 
are coinsureds under the insurance policy for actions taken within the course and scope of 
their employment. "An insurer which accepts a premium based partially on the inclusion 
of a coinsured under a policy of insurance has assumed the risk of [her] negligence." 
Board of Educ. of Jordan Sch. Dist. v. Hales. 566 P.2d 1246, 1247 (Utah 1977): see also 
Fashion Place Inv.. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County. 776 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989) (citing 16 
Couch on Insurance 2d § 61:137 (Rev. Ed. 1983) ("Where the insured is required by 
contract or lease to carry insurance for the benefit of another, the other party may attain 
the status of a de facto coinsured even if not named as an insured in the policy 
obtained.")). 
4
 The employer's liability is derivative liability and, thus, the employer normally is 
entitled to be reimbursed by the employee for sums paid because of the employee's 
negligence (unless the employee's conduct is part of the employer's core duties). 
However, the fact of the employer's excess liability should not be confused with its 
insurer's primary coverage. 
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Whether an employee is presumed to be a coinsured with her employer when there 
is no written or oral agreement between the parties regarding responsibility for insurance 
coverage is an issue of first impression in Utah. The Utah case which comes closest to 
being on point is GNS Partnership vs. Fullmer. See GNS Partnership v. Fullmer. 873 
P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1994). Fullmer only discussed coinsured status with respect to 
tenants of apartment buildings. While some of the reasoning employed by the Court in 
that case is inapposite to the instant matter, the major idea compels the same result of 
coinsured status — at least insofar as Chubb's potential right of subrogation is concerned. 
Chubb insured Wagon Tongue knowing that it was a corporation with employees 
who would perform its business. Wagon Tongue paid a premium to Chubb in order to 
provide non-owned auto coverage during those periods when Wagon Tongue had a 
possessory interest in its employees' vehicles. 
In Fashion Place, the Court reasoned: 
When [the corporation] agreed to provide insurance for [its business] 
it assumed the risk of its coinsureds' negligence. "The insurer, which 
has accepted one premium covering the entire [business] and has 
assumed the risk of the negligence of each insured party, ought not 
to be allowed to shift the risk to any one of them." 
Fashion Place Inv.. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989) (quoting Board of Educ. 566 P.2d at 1248). Equity will not 
14 
permit Chubb to insure a corporation for liability assumed because of the negligent acts of 
its agents and simultaneously retain its equitable right of maintaining a subrogation action 
against those agents for damages arising out of the risk Chubb had agreed to take upon 
itself in exchange for payment of the premium. 
VI. THE COURT MAY NOT AFFIRM THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
JUDGMENT ON ANY THEORY WHICH IS NOT APPARENT 
FROM THE RECORD. 
The appellate courts often stake a claim to authority allowing them to affirm a 
lower court's judgment "on any basis." See, e.g., Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 
231 (Utah 1993) (cited in Chubb's Opposition Brief at p. 2). The Court may not rely on 
the artless "on any basis" jargon to defeat a party's right to due process. See Utah Const. 
Art. I, § 7. 
It is true that the appellate courts retain the right to affirm a lower court's 
judgment, but only "on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." Limb v. 
Federated Milk Producers Ass'n. 461 P.2d 290, n. 2 (Utah 1969) (quoting 5 CJ.S. Appeal 
& Error § 1464(1) (emphasis added)). In other words, the Court may not affirm the lower 
court's judgment on the basis of legal theories raised by the Court sua sponte. See Ong 
Int'l (U.S.A.). Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) (holding the failure 
to raise issue below precludes its consideration on appeal); accord John Deere Co. v. A & 
15 
H Equip.. Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah App. 1994). If the Court affirmed the lower 
court's judgment on its own theory, it would violate the losing party's due process right to 
be heard and would destroy the adversarial model upon which our legal system is based. 
Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah. 681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984) (stating that due 
process involves "procedural requirements, notably notice and [an] opportunity to be 
heard."); see also Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp.. 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991) 
(refusing to act as an advocate for a party who did not present more than conclusions 
contained in affidavits, even for a party who was acting pro se, because such conduct by 
the court would be "both highly improper and unfair to opposing parties"); see also In re 
Cassitv, 875 P.2d 548 (Utah 1994) (holding that because our judicial system is the 
adversarial model, lawyers are bound by rigid ethical standards designed to preserve that 
system's integrity). 
The record is void of any basis upon which the Court may affirm the district 
court's ruling. Therefore, the district court's ruling must be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should reverse the district court's ruling and 
enter a summary judgment in favor of Workmen's Auto. Because Chubb's coverage was 
concurrently primary, Chubb should be ordered to pay the sum of $3,790.95 plus 
prejudgment interest to Workmen's Auto. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ day of December, 1998. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Workmen's Auto Insurance Company 
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